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OPINION OF THE COURT
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PER CURIAM.
The plaintiffs in these three cases – which we shall refer to as Romero I,
Romero II, and EEOC – allege that they were harmed by Allstate’s transition from a

6

system where insurance agents were company employees to a system where the agents
were independent contractors, and by Allstate’s alteration of its employee retirement
plan.1 After many years of litigation, the District Court granted Allstate’s dispositive
motions in a two-page order. The order is conclusory in tone and content and simply fails
to do justice to the myriad issues before the court. This has made our ability to carry out
our review function difficult, indeed. We will vacate the order and remand the cases to
the District Court. Given what we perceive to be the disinclination of the District Court
to give full consideration to the procedural and substantive nuances of those cases, we
will direct that the matter be reassigned.

I. Background 2
In the course of Allstate’s transition from an employee-agent program to an
independent-contractor program, in 2000, all employee agents operating under the earlier

1

In Romero I (07-4460), the plaintiffs make claims for age discrimination and
retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, claims of interference under
ERISA § 510, common law claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty, claims
related to the signing of the release, and claims related to the District Court’s handling of
the litigation.
In Romero II (07-4461), the plaintiffs allege violations of ERISA § 204(g)(2),
which prohibits plan amendments that reduce or eliminate already-accrued benefits, and
seek equitable relief for Allstate’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404.
In EEOC (08-1122), the agency claims that Allstate retaliated against the plaintiffs
in violation of the ADEA. The District Court consolidated Romero I and EEOC in 2002.
2

Because we write here only for the parties, we will not fully describe the factual
background or procedural history of these three cases.
7

agreements known as R830 and R1500 contracts were terminated. They were given four
post-termination options, the first three of which involved the signing of a release that
barred future claims against Allstate. Under the options that required the signing of the
release, each employee would: 1) become an independent contractor; or 2) become an
independent contractor temporarily and then sell the book of business to an Allstateapproved buyer; or 3) leave Allstate and receive a full year’s salary as severance pay. The
fourth option, and the only one that did not require signing of the release, was to receive
13 weeks’ salary as severance. Virtually all of the eligible employee agents took one of
the first three options and signed the release. All of the current plaintiffs signed the
release.3
In 1991, before the conversion to an all-independent-contractor workforce, Allstate
retroactively amended its pension plan. Allstate says that it made these amendments in
response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which required companies to adopt benefits
formulas that did not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. The
amendments included changes to the way Allstate calculated early retirement benefits. In
1994, Allstate re-adopted its 1991 plan amendments, some of which were the subject of
litigation at that time in Scott v. Admin. Comm. of the Allstate Agents Pension Plan, No.

3

One of the original plaintiffs, Douglas Gafner, did not sign the release. The parties
advised us at oral argument that Mr. Gafner’s estate had settled its claims with Allstate.
(Mar. 23, 2009, Oral Arg. Tr. 15.) Therefore, all of the remaining plaintiffs are signers of
the release.
8

93-1419, 1995 WL 661096 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 1995), and adopted a new amendment
changing eligibility for early retirement benefits.
The three cases on appeal were filed in 2001. Over the course of the subsequent
eight years, there have been numerous motions to dismiss, motions for summary
judgment, motions to compel, and motions for reconsideration, as well as a 2004
declaratory judgment that the releases were voidable, and an appeal to our court and a
remand to the District Court in Romero II.
On March 21, 2007, after the plaintiffs had asked Chief Judge Bartle to reassign
the cases because of the District Court’s ongoing failure to act on pending motions, the
District Court entered an order stating its intent to grant Allstate’s outstanding motions
(for dismissal in Romero II and for summary judgment in Romero I/EEOC) based on
several other cases that the court said had already considered and ruled on the transactions
at issue, Isbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 418 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2005),4 Scott v. Admin. Comm.

4

In Isbell, two former Allstate employee agents alleged violations of the ADEA, Title
VII, the ADA, and ERISA, as well as retaliation and unlawful termination claims. One of
the plaintiffs, Schneider, had signed the release; the other, Isbell, had not. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that there had been no unlawful
retaliation under the ADEA, ADA, Title VII, or ERISA, and that Allstate had not
unlawfully discriminated against the terminated employee agents in violation of the
ADEA. The court also held that Allstate had not violated ERISA when it eliminated the
employee agents’ positions for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and that the release
was “an effective affirmative defense” to claims raised under the statutes and doctrines
named in it. 418 F.3d at 797.
9

of the Allstate Agents Pension Plan, 113 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 1997),5 and Swain v.
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-0998 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 1999).6 The court also advised the
parties that it was rethinking its 2004 ruling that the releases were voidable, and believed
it was in error and should be vacated. It gave the parties 20 days to file additional
memoranda. The plaintiffs responded to the District Court’s order, arguing, in part, that
the releases were part of an illegal scheme, that their execution was not knowing or
voluntary, and that they were unconscionable. The plaintiffs also protested that they had
not had the opportunity for discovery beyond a brief period of class discovery.
On June 20, 2007, the District Court issued an order granting Allstate’s motion to
dismiss in Romero II and its motion for summary judgment in Romero I/EEOC. The
court said that “for the reasons stated in” Scott and Swain, the amendments to Allstate’s
pension plan at issue in Romero II were validly adopted and effective. It also stated that

5

In Scott, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealt with
amendments to Allstate’s retirement plan made in November of 1991. The plaintiffs
alleged that Allstate had failed to comply with ERISA § 204(h)’s notice provisions when
it retroactively amended its plan to comply with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and that
therefore the amendments were ineffective. The court concluded that ERISA’s notice
requirement was satisfied and that the plan amendments adopted on November 15, 1991,
could be retroactive to January 1, 1989. 113 F.3d at 1201.
6

The Swain plaintiffs also objected to Allstate’s pension plan amendments. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that Scott barred the
plaintiffs’ claims as to retroactivity, because the same claim could have been brought in
Scott and the interests of the Scott and Swain plaintiffs were so closely aligned that the
Scott plaintiffs were virtual representatives of the Swain plaintiffs. The court allowed
claims that Allstate had made misrepresentations to the plaintiffs to go forward. (Joint
App. 5525-27.)
10

Isbell “warrants the conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims of ERISA violations, age
discrimination, and retaliation must fail.” (Joint App. 13.) The court ordered that, “[t]o
the extent that this Court’s Order of March 3 [sic], 2004 declared that the releases were
voidable, that decision was in error and is hereby vacated. Alternatively, the validity of
the releases has become moot.” (Joint App. 13.) The order gave the parties 20 days to
submit “any issues that must be resolved before the case-files are closed.” (Joint App.
14.) The parties submitted additional papers. The District Court did not issue a final
judgment.7 The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on November 26, 2007.

7

The parties dispute whether we have jurisdiction over these appeals, since the District
Court never issued a separate final judgment. The plaintiffs argue that we do have
jurisdiction, because the District Court’s order left no issue unresolved and was therefore
final. Allstate argues that we do not have jurisdiction because the court did not comply
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, which requires that judgment be entered in a separate document.
While we find it puzzling that the District Court did not enter a separate judgment, it is
apparent that the court left no issues unresolved: it granted or denied all of the
outstanding motions before it, and the parties proceeded as if judgment had been entered,
complying with all deadlines. The plaintiffs waited more than 150 days after the District
Court’s order was entered in the docket before considering judgment to be entered and
filing their notice of appeal, in compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) and
4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Thus, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See AlvordPolk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1006 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the
“district court’s failure to enter judgment in accordance with the dictates of Rule 58
appears to stem from oversight” and therefore “common-sense” application of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, as encouraged by the Supreme Court in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis,
435 U.S. 381, 385-86 (1978), warranted exercise of appellate jurisdiction).

11

II. Discussion 8
The plaintiffs in these cases raise numerous ways in which the District Court’s
opinion and conduct of the proceedings fell short, including, but not limited to, its failure
to explain why Scott, Swain, and Isbell should be given res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect, or controlling weight, here (especially since Scott and Swain did not consider the
anti-cutback amendments); why the plaintiffs are not entitled to the discovery they
requested; why the ADEA claims are controlled by Isbell; and how the court resolved the
counts which were not reached in its opinion. We do not seek to address all of these
issues here: indeed, the lack of explication by the District Court renders our review
function as to these aspects of the cases nearly impossible. In this opinion, we focus on
the release signed by all of the current plaintiffs. If the release is valid, it bars the claims
of the plaintiffs in Romero I, Count II of Romero II, and EEOC.9 The plaintiffs, however,
8

We review a district court’s grant of motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment de novo. See, e.g., Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir.
2007); Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2007).
9

The EEOC focuses its argument on those Allstate employees who did not sign the
release, a group the EEOC calls “the holdouts.” It claims that the holdouts’ refusal to
sign the release is protected activity under the ADEA, either as protected participation
activity (it argues that the refusal to sign could be interpreted as a threat to sue) or as
protected opposition conduct. The EEOC contends that Allstate’s refusal to allow the
holdouts to become independent contractor agents is an adverse action, and that the
option to convert to independent contractor status was a privilege of the employee agents’
employment. Allstate contests the EEOC’s claim that the holdouts’ refusal to sign the
release was protected activity, and argues that the offer of independent contractor status
for the terminated employee agents was not an incident of employment, but rather part of
the consideration for the signing of the release. Because there are no holdouts among the
current plaintiffs, we need not address these issues.
12

did not have sufficient discovery into the facts surrounding the signing of the releases, or
sufficient time to produce it, given the court’s about-face in 2007, and there is insufficient
evidence in the record, let alone in the reasoning provided by the court, as to whether the
releases were signed knowingly or voluntarily, or were unconscionable. If the releases
are not valid, then the District Court needs to address a number of issues, namely the
merits of all the claims in Romero II and the common law claims of breach of contract
and breach of fiduciary duty in Romero I, that it must consider in the first instance. We
will remand to the District Court for further discovery into the validity of the releases.
It is arguable that, even if the releases are not valid, the ERISA § 510 claims and
the ADEA claims of discrimination and retaliation were properly dismissed because of
the plaintiffs’ failure to adduce evidence showing a dispute as to a genuine issue of
material fact on those issues. However, it is difficult on the record before us to determine
whether discovery on these claims was sufficient. We will therefore remand to the
District Court for further consideration of these claims. In so doing, we charge the
District Court with reviewing the discovery requests and determining whether the
plaintiffs were afforded sufficient opportunity for discovery on the ERISA § 510 and the
ADEA discrimination and retaliation claims. If not, the District Court should permit

The EEOC also raises, briefly, an argument that Allstate engaged in what the
EEOC terms “preemptive” retaliation against the signers of the release. (EEOC Br. at 2628.) It argues that the signers were injured by being required to sign the releases. We
will not address the EEOC’s preemptive retaliation argument in this opinion. Rather, we
will return the cases to the District Court for further review of the validity of the releases.
13

further discovery as necessary.
A. The Release
The release that the plaintiffs signed is very broad. We reproduce the waiver
language here:
In return for the consideration that I am receiving under the
Program, I hereby release, waive, and forever discharge
Allstate Insurance Company . . . from any and all liability,
actions, charges, causes of action, demands, damages,
entitlements or claims for relief or remuneration of any kind
whatsoever, whether known or unknown, or whether
previously asserted or unasserted, stated or unstated, arising
out of, connected with, or related to, my employment and/or
the termination of my employment and my R830 or R1500
Agent Agreement with Allstate, or my transition to
independent contractor status, including, but not limited to, all
matters in law, in equity, in contract, or in tort, or pursuant to
statute, including any claim for age or other types of
discrimination prohibited under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), the Illinois
Human Rights Act, and the West Virginia Human Rights Act
as those acts have been amended, or any other federal, state,
or local law or ordinance or the common law. I further agree
that if any claim is made in my behalf with respect to any
matter released and waived above, I hereby waive any rights I
may have with respect thereto and agree not to take any
payments or other benefits from such claim. I understand that
this release and waiver does not apply to any future claims
that may arise after I sign this Release or to any benefits to
which I am entitled in accordance with any Allstate plan
subject to ERISA by virtue of my employment with Allstate
prior to my employment termination date.
(Joint App. 2352.) The release also includes an acknowledgment for signers:
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I acknowledge that:
(a) I have read this Release, and I understand its legal and
binding effect. I am acting voluntarily and of my own free
will in executing this Release.
(b) I have had the opportunity to seek, and I was advised in
writing to seek the advice of an attorney prior to signing this
release. . . .
(c) I was given at least 45 days to consider the terms of the
Program, including this Release, before signing it. I
understand that I may make an election under the Program
before forty-five (45) days, but I am under no obligation to do
so.
(Joint App. 2352.)
The release also includes a revocation period:
I understand that if I sign this Release, I can change my mind
and revoke it within seven days after signing it. I understand
that the Release and Waiver set forth in the first paragraph
and the consideration available under the Program above will
not be effective until after this seven-day period has expired.
. . . I understand that a decision to revoke or rescind within
such period should be submitted in writing to my Human
Resource Manager. If I do not revoke within the seven-day
period discussed above . . ., then the Release will become
fully effective.
(Joint App. 2352.)
1. The District Court’s Decisions Regarding the Release
In March of 2004, the District Court found that the release was voidable “at the
option of the employee-agent” because the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(“OWBPA”) says that no waiver agreement can prohibit an individual from filing a
15

charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626; 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(I)(2)
(“[N]o waiver agreement may include any provision prohibiting any individual from . . .
filing a charge or complaint, including a challenge to the validity of the waiver
agreement, with the EEOC.”) The District Court issued a declaratory judgment allowing
each plaintiff who signed the release to tender back 10 the benefits he had received in order
to void the release.
In December of 2005, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment in Romero
I/EEOC, arguing, in part, that the release was valid. Allstate cited Isbell v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 418 F.3d 788, 797 (7th Cir. 2005), a case in which two former Allstate employee
agents, one of whom signed the release and one of whom did not, alleged retaliation,
discrimination, and unlawful termination in connection with Allstate’s transition to the
independent contractor program. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the release was valid and found no discrimination or retaliation under the
ADEA, the ADA, Title VII, or ERISA. In its Romero I/EEOC summary judgment
motion, Allstate also argued that the District Court’s reasoning that the charge-filing ban
in the release made it voidable was contrary to our decision in Wastak v. Lehigh Valley
Health Network, 342 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 2003), in which we upheld the validity of a
release despite the fact that it contained a charge-filing ban. In Wastak, we held that 29

10

After the District Court issued its declaratory judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion
for reconsideration, arguing that the tender-back requirement was inappropriate. They
raise this argument on appeal, but we need not address that issue here.
16

U.S.C. § 626(f)(4) made it unlawful to enforce a ban on filing an EEOC charge, but that
the statute contained no language to suggest that “the mere presence of that contractual
language would void an otherwise knowing and voluntary waiver.” Id. The District
Court cited Isbell in its June 20, 2007, order granting Allstate’s dispositive motions and
vacating its previous order that the releases were voidable.
2. The Parties’ Arguments About the Release
From the start of the litigation, the plaintiffs have argued that the releases are
invalid. On appeal, they argue that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the
plaintiffs signed the releases knowingly and voluntarily. The plaintiffs allege that
Allstate refused to negotiate the release and exerted extreme economic pressure, made
misrepresentations about the independent contractor program, and did not comply with
disclosure requirements under the OWBPA. The plaintiffs also contend that the release is
part of an illegal scheme, and that it is unconscionable both procedurally and
substantively because the release is so favorable to Allstate.
Plaintiffs argue, further, that they did not have sufficient discovery into the facts
surrounding the signing of the releases. From March of 2004 to December of 2005, they
had proceeded under the District Court’s declaratory judgment that the release was
voidable. With Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, the release was at issue again.
The plaintiffs filed a motion to deny or stay the summary judgment motion so that they
could conduct merits discovery, and they filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit that described the

17

brief period that the District Court had allowed for “class discovery” in 2002 and 2003,
the plaintiffs’ multiple document requests, and the motions to compel discovery that the
District Court had denied without resolving the underlying disputes. The court did not
rule on the motion to stay.
Allstate counters that discovery was not limited to class issues, and points to its
production of three Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses and 126,000 pages of
documents produced, (including 68,000 pages from the Isbell litigation). It argues that
not only was discovery sufficient, but that the release is valid: the plaintiffs are welleducated, experienced businesspeople whose work involved parsing contract language;
they had almost six months to consider signing the release and a week after signing in
which to revoke; they were encouraged to consult attorneys before signing; they received
ample consideration in exchange for their assent; and they expressly represented that they
signed the releases voluntarily and of their own free will.
3. Why the Release is Potentially Dispositive
If the release is valid, it bars the plaintiffs’ claims in Romero I, where the plaintiffs
allege violations of the ADEA and ERISA, as well as common law claims of breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty. It would also bar the claims in EEOC that Allstate
retaliated against the plaintiffs in violation of the ADEA. All of these claims are covered
by the broad language of the release, which specifically mentions both those statutes and
common law claims. It also bars the plaintiffs’ claims in Count II of Romero II, where

18

the plaintiffs claim violations of ERISA § 404, which provides an equitable remedy for a
breach of fiduciary duty claim.11
We believe the District Court should reexamine the validity of the release, after
allowing further discovery into the facts surrounding the signing of the releases. The
plaintiffs had a relatively short period of class discovery, and approximately half of the
documents Allstate produced were documents from the Isbell litigation. While Isbell is
certainly relevant to the plaintiffs’ cases here, the plaintiffs are entitled to discovery that
is responsive to their requests related to the specific release-related issues the plaintiffs
raised with the District Court in their response to its March 21, 2007, Order: that the
releases were part of an illegal scheme; that they were not signed knowingly or
voluntarily; and that they were unconscionable.
If, after discovery and briefing on these issues, the District Court determines that
the releases are valid, then the claims in Romero I, Count II of Romero II, and EEOC are
barred. If, however, the District Court determines that the releases are not valid, the
District Court needs to address all of the underlying claims and issues that it did not

11

Counts I and III of Romero II deal with the plaintiffs’ claims that Allstate’s
amendment of its retirement plan violates the anti-cutback provisions of ERISA § 204(g).
The language of the release is very broad and covers ERISA claims, other than those
claims to “any benefits to which I am entitled in accordance with any Allstate plan subject
to ERISA by virtue of my employment with Allstate prior to my employment termination
date.” (Joint App. 2352.) We do not decide whether Counts I and III of Romero II fit
within this exception. Rather, if the release is valid, the District Court must consider on
remand whether the claims in Counts I and III of Romero II are claims for benefits to
which the plaintiffs were entitled in accordance with any Allstate ERISA plan.
19

decide in its June 20, 2007, Order, some of which we referred to above, namely, the
common law claims of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and all the claims
in Romero II. We are confident that on remand the parties can spell these out for the
District Court, as they have done for us on appeal, including the plaintiffs’ claim that
discovery as to these issues and the release should be permitted.12

12

We take this opportunity to register some concern regarding the District Court’s
ruling granting Allstate’s motion to dismiss Romero II on June 20, 2007, when it stated
that “[f]or the reasons stated in the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Scott v. Administrative Comm. of the Allstate Agents Pension Plan, 113 F.3d 1193 (11th
Cir. 1997), and the later decision of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in Swain v. Allstate Ins. Co. (No. 96-0998) (Jan. 22, 1999), the
questioned amendments to the Allstate Pension Plan were validly adopted and became
effective.” (Joint App. 13.) In the District Court’s previous order, on March 21, 2007, it
said that the Scott and Swain decisions establish that the questioned amendments to the
Allstate pension plan were validly adopted, regardless of whether the other cases “give
rise to a res judicata defense, or whether the plaintiffs in those cases should be regarded
as in privity with the plaintiffs in our cases so as to give rise to collateral estoppel . . . .”
(Joint App. 1224.)
We disagree with the District Court that Scott and Swain are dispositive of the
validity of the amendments at issue in Romero II. Scott addressed different pension plan
amendments than those at issue here. It dealt with the Social Security benefit offset, the
benefit accrual rate, and the retirement age. In Romero II, the amendments at issue deal
with the “beef-up” for early retirement (adopted in 1991), the definition of “credited
service” (adopted in 1994), and the definition of “employee” (adopted in 1996). The
issues are not the same. Indeed, the Scott plaintiffs’ claims were based on an alleged lack
of notice of the reduction in benefit accruals under the notice provisions of ERISA
§ 204(h), whereas the Romero II plaintiffs allege violations of ERISA § 204(g)(2), which
prohibits plan amendments that reduce or eliminate already-accrued benefits. The
plaintiffs in Swain challenged the 1991 Allstate plan amendments, alleging that Allstate
misrepresented that the amendments were required by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and
arguing that the amendments could not be implemented retroactively. The Swain court
found that Scott precluded all but the misrepresentation claims. Swain v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
No. 06-0998 (Jan. 22, 1999). (Joint App. 5507-28.) The claims at issue in Romero II go
directly to the substance of the amendments at issue, not the logistical propriety of their
20

For the reasons set forth above, we will VACATE the Order of the District Court
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

enactment, as in Scott and Swain. Therefore, these cases are not conclusive on this issue.
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